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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a historical overview of microfinance development in Zimbabwe. The paper adopted a 
historical analysis approach. Information was gathered from secondary sources about microcredit and microfinance. Historical 
analysis’ main advantage is its ability to establish a context or background for us to set a contemporary study in microfinance. 
Findings show that microfinance is a new phenomenon that evolved from microcredit. Globally, the idea of microcredit dates 
back to the 15th century. For Zimbabwe, microcredit started in the 20th century (slightly above 4 centuries later). The paper 
used historical sources which may not provide robust results. The analysis is important for the development of the microfinance 
industry. Knowledge of microfinance historical antecedents is likely to contribute to our understanding of the current 
microfinance sector conditions in the country, thus influencing policy. Most papers, when narrating the history of microfinance 
start from the 1970s when Yunus started microcredit programs in Bangladesh. This history is not wholly true because Yunus 
did not start from zero, microfinance was only re-kindled by Yunus but it has had a long and old history. This paper argues that 
the roots of microfinance go before the 1970s. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Microfinance evolved and expanded from the narrow field of microcredit (Helms, 2006; Elahi and Rahman, 2006; Henry 
et al, 2003). Microcredit is a narrow view of giving small loans to poor people while microfinance is a more 
comprehensive concept that encompasses a wide range of financial services for poor people. Helms (2006) gives a 
historical evolution of microcredit and eventually microfinance.  
The ideas of microfinance date back to the 15th century when pawn shops were established in Europe as 
alternatives to usurious money-lending. In the 1700s, the Irish Loan Fund System was established in Ireland. The 1800s 
saw the emergence of financial cooperatives in Germany. These were developed by Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen and his 
supporters. These cooperatives were developed to improve the welfare of the rural and urban poor people. In 1895, 
Indonesia developed the idea of banks for poor people by establishing the Indonesian People’s Credit Banks. 
Savings and credit activities began to appear in Latin America and elsewhere in the early 1900s (Helms, 2006). 
New banks for the poor were developed to mobilize ‘idle’ savings and promote investments. However, the banks were 
not owned by the poor but by government agencies and private banks. Unfortunately, Helms laments, the institutions 
were inefficient and corrupt. The evolving idea was developed into agricultural credit by governments and donors 
between the 1950s and the 1970s (Helms, 2006). Agricultural credit had an aim of raising productivity and incomes of 
small and marginalized farmers through the provision of credit. Government owned financial institutions were offering 
credit at below-market interest rates. This had detrimental effects on the financial institutions as they failed to recover 
costs. Furthermore, customers viewed loans from government agencies as gifts and this impacted negatively on the 
repayment rate. The problem is still prevalent in developing countries where politicians take advantage of this loophole to 
win the hearts of the electorate. In other situations, credit was not reaching the poor; instead it ended up in the hands of 
rich and influential farmers (the rural elites). 
The “microcredit” concept was re-born in the 1970s. It then attained world-wide recognition when Muhammad 
Yunus started (as a pilot project with his graduate students at Chittagong University in 1976) making small loans to the 
poor villagers in Bangladesh (Khandker, 1998; Zeller and Sharma, 1998 & 2002; Zeller and Meyer, 2002; Robinson, 
2001; Yunus, 2003 and 2004; Amendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). Microcredit received worldwide attention when 
people started welcoming it as a poverty alleviation strategy. Results from the popular Grameen model were encouraging 
(Kandker, 1998; Karmakar, 1999; Robinson, 2001; Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005; Menon, 2006). The 
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Grameen model used the group lending methodology as a way of delivering financial services to the poor people. Given 
that the poor lack physical collateral security, the model advocated for what it called “social collateral” which involved a 
peer pressure strategy among group members. The bank realized an average loan recovery rate of more than 95 per 
cent (Khandker, 1998). This was contrary to conventional wisdom that the poor cannot be reliable customers in finance 
(Carr and Yi Tong, 2002; Helms, 2006). Low-income or poor people are marginalized because they lack the credentials 
and physical collateral that is required by traditional financiers (the banks). 
Learning from the Grameen Bank model, microcredit expanded (in the 1980s) to Latin America, India, Brazil and 
Africa. Organizations such as ACCION International (which began in Latin America), the Self-Employed Women’s 
Associations (SEWA) bank in India, BancoSol in Brazil, K-Rep and Equity Banks in Kenya emerged. These institutions 
are still in existence today and are expanding their operations. 
The realization of structural barriers to providing savings and credit service to the poor (Elahi and Rahman, 2006) 
motivated the emergence of microcredit programs. Structural barriers facing the poor people include information 
asymmetries, lack of collateral, high transaction costs, high risk and systematic market bias (Elahi and Rahman, 2006). 
Proponents of microcredit such as Yunus (1998, 2003, and 2004) and FINCA (2007), suggest that these barriers could 
be overcome through the provision of small loans to the poor. The loans will then help them to develop their businesses 
and pull them out of poverty traps or break out of the poverty ‘vicious cycle’ and enter a ‘virtuous cycle’. The Grameen 
Bank’s success in reaching the poor and high loan recovery attracted world-wide attention. As mentioned earlier, many 
countries started to replicate the Grameen Bank’s group-lending methodology for providing loans to the poor and low-
income groups. For example, in Indonesia, the Bank Rakyat was established to serve poor people. The bank proved that 
the poor can be good customers in finance. 
The term “microcredit” was getting replaced by “microfinance” in the early 1990s (Helms, 2006). The success of 
microcredit programs led to the 1997 microcredit summit that attracted 2900 delegates from 137 countries representing 
1500 organizations the world over. The term micro-finance then emerged and took center stage in the late 1990s (Elahi 
and Rahman, 2006:477; Edward & Olsen, 2006). Elahi and Rahman explain the functional and conceptual differences 
between “microcredit” and “microfinance”. 
Microcredit involves the provision of small loans to the poor (credit as the missing piece). On the other hand, 
microfinance encompasses a range of financial and non-financial services that include savings, insurance, money 
transfers, training and social engagements over and above credit. Today, the provision of microfinance ranges from 
traditional informal suppliers to commercial banks. Commercial banks are starting to enter the microfinance sector so as 
to provide financial services to the poor. Traditional banks are slow to take up the challenge of providing credit to the 
poor people because they rate them as risky borrowers. However, the current focus is now on researching to find out 
ways of building an inclusive finance system that works for the poor (Rhyne, 2013; Helms, 2006; Rhyne, 1998). This 
study is poised to contribute towards the research focus.  
Poor people lack physical collateral security, which is an integral traditional requirement needed by lenders. 
However, the proponents of microfinance have discovered that the poor can pay back. The Grameen Bank’s group 
lending methodology identified ‘social collateral security’ that the poor people possess (Khandker, 1998). Empirical 
evidence from the Grameen Bank experience has recorded about 95% repayment rate by the poor borrowers. Khandker 
notes the following; 
Grameen Bank, founded in 1976 as a project and transformed into a specialized bank in 1983, is the best-known 
micro-credit program. By 1994 it had mobilized more than 2 million members, 94 percent of them women, and achieved a 
loan recovery rate of more than 95 percent (Khandker, 1998:3).  
IFAD (2004) states that in countries as diverse as Bangladesh, Benin and Dominica, repayment rates are as high 
as 97 per cent. This strengthens Khandker’s statistical evidence about high repayment rates by microfinance participants 
although they are regarded ‘unbankable’ in the traditional financial sector. This high rate was achieved by the bank’s 
group-lending methodology that took advantage of the social capital1. Access to financial resources has been hailed as 
an intervention for poverty alleviation.  
In 1984, John Hatch2 came up with a new model called “village banking”. This is a unique and influential method 
for delivering non-collateralized small loans, savings and other financial services to the poor worldwide (FINCA, 2007). 
                                                                            
1 Social Capital refers to connection within and between social networks. It also refers to goodwill, fellowship, sympathy and social 
intercourse in a community. It is the ‘cement’ that keeps the social fabric intact.  (see Vermaak ,2009 for a comprehensive articulation of 
social Capital) 
2 John Hatch in the inventor of the “Village Banking Model” and founder of FINCA(a global microfinance institution). He is a co-founder 
of the Global  Micro-credit Summit. 
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Village banking is gaining momentum and is proving to be an effective tool for poverty alleviation among the poor people. 
The poor people were being organized into groups, giving them the power to collectively disburse, invest and collect loan 
capital as they saw fit. This program then gained the name “Village Banking.” Zimbabwe has its own microfinance history 
that forms part of the international developments of the sector. 
2. The Evolution and Development of Microfinance in Zimbabwe. 
 
The Zimbabwean microfinance sector dates back to the 1960s when people were mobilized into groups to form savings 
clubs. Even before these groupings, people had other sources of credits such as friends and relatives. This is a universal 
phenomenon which is not exclusive to Zimbabwe. According to Adams and Raymond (2008) informal credit sources, 
such as family members and friends, moneylenders, commercial agents and group-based Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations (ROSCAs) have been providing peasants with credits for centuries. This applies to the Zimbabwean 
scenario as well. In Zimbabwe private moneylenders offer exorbitant or usurious loans called ‘chimbadzo’ (meaning 
exploitative lending).  
Raftopoulos and Lacoste (2001) and Bond (1998) narrate that the Zimbabwean microfinance dates back to 1963 
when the Catholic Missionary initiated the Savings Development Movement (SDM). The organization focused on micro-
savings mobilization by rural women. The women operated in groups thus SDM savings club was established. The club’s 
sustenance was based upon financial savings generated by club members.  
Savings clubs grew in numbers from 30 in 1970 to 1500 in 1974 as established by Raftopoulos and Lacoste. They 
further reported that during the same period, club membership increased from 2000 to 3000. They also noted that the 
savings clubs reached 3000 in 1975 with 60 000 active members. However, their activities were hampered by the 
liberation struggle activities (1976 to 1980). War is always an underdevelopment catalyst and it provides a fertile ground 
for inflation and other negative socio-economic forces. After the Zimbabwean independence (i.e. 1980) SDM was then 
registered as a cooperative (Bond, 1998; Bond and Manayanya, 2002 & 2003).  
The post-independence period created an enabling environment for the continuation of savings clubs that had 
been stopped in the previous years. Raftopolous and Lacoste note that savings clubs increased from 5000 in 1983 to 
7000 in 1998. This remarkable increase was a clear sign of the demand for microfinance by the poor. In the early 1980s 
the Agricultural Finance Cooperation (AFC), a parastatal, was central in extending loans to small-holder farmers.  
In a bid to support the mobilization of savings by the poor, the government established the National Association of 
Cooperative Savings and Credit Unions of Zimbabwe (NACSCUZ) in 1986. This was under the Ministry of Community 
Development and Women’s Affairs. NACSCUZ’s main aim was to provide technical support services to savings and 
credit cooperatives. Its other objectives were the provision of training, monitoring and evaluation of credit cooperatives. 
The Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) era (1991-1995) created an environment that had serious 
repercussions on the poor. ESAP, among other things called for financial liberalization. This policy prescription led to an 
increase in interest rates, hence reducing the access to loans by the poor (Moyo, 1999). Due to increased government 
borrowing, removal of subsidies on basic goods, trade liberalization and devaluation, there was an increase in inflationary 
pressures in the country. These macroeconomic conditions posed a threat to micro-credit activities in the country. 
Liberalization in the financial sector created an environment that was not favorable to the poor as was noted by Moyo: 
 
The increasingly competitive environment created by reforms has led to a much tougher approach by banks in terms of 
lending to the poor. It has always been hard for this group to get loans from banks. It is now more difficult. Collateral 
requirements have been maintained if not actually made stiffer in some cases as banks perceive the environment to be 
riskier. Even Development Banks which used to be more flexible and would look at project viability rather than short-term 
profitability, now tend to look at profitability (Moyo, 1999:3) 
 
In 1996, the Self-Help Development Foundation (SHDF) was formed in place of the SDM. A micro-credit scheme 
was introduced by SHDF in the same year, which was meant to promote savings among the poor (Raftopoulos and 
Lacoste, 2001). The ESAP challenges invited initiatives from international NGOs (in 1997) such as Konrad Adenaur 
Foundation (KAF), CARE International and the Belgium based Association pour la developpement oar la recherché et 
l’action integree [" Association for the Development by Research and Integrated Action"] (ADRAI). The international 
NGOs gave financial support to SHDF’s microcredit activities. Raftopoulos and Lascote observe that they promoted, 
among other things, the development of sound credit methodologies, improvement of governance and establishment of 
sustainable revolving funds. This kind of support is needed today for a full blown development of microfinance institutions 
so as to realize credible microfinance methodologies and sustainability. 
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However, the SHDF idea faced criticism because of a number of challenges involved. Raftopoulos and Lacoste 
argue that credit to the poor creates problems such as lack of capacity to cope with credit. Rich people often have access 
to credit at the expense of the poor. Furthermore, most of the microfinance programs are financed by donors and people 
do not feel responsible about donor money. Donor money is frequently misused and borrowers are reluctant to pay back 
when they borrow. According to Raftopoulos and Lacoste (2001), the SHDF program showed impressive results between 
1996 and 2000 through the support by USAID (through CARE), and ADRAI. Table 1 below shows the program’s portfolio 
growth between 1996 and 2000. 
 
 Table 1: SHDF’s Portfolio Growth 1996- 2000 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 TOTAL 
Loans disbursed 117 775 2315 4542 7097 14864 
Total amount disbursed 119 800 1055600 4077900 11716854 31977346 48707900 
  
Sources: Raftopoulos and Lacoste (2001). 
 
As shown in Table 1 above, loans disbursed increased steadily from 117 in 1996 to 7097 in 2000. The total amounts 
disbursed also increased from Z$119 800 in 1996 to Z$31 977 346 in 2000. This increase demonstrates the high 
demand for loans by the poor and low income groups. The political environment in Zimbabwe has had profound effects 
on microfinance activities, with the liberation struggle disturbing the progress and the recent political landscape 
negatively affecting microfinance activities. The following section gives a snapshot of political events in Zimbabwe and 
their implications on the economy in general and microfinance in particular.  
3. The Zimbabwean Microfinance Sector 
 
This sector remains underdeveloped and generally informal in Zimbabwe. Microfinance activities also face a number of 
challenges. However, they remain subdued with hyperinflation, (between 2000 and 2009) acute foreign currency 
shortages, high unemployment levels, high incidences of poverty and a decline in real incomes and standards of living. 
On the other hand the industrial base is also shrinking. The aforesaid conditions have made policymakers to divert their 
attention away from microfinance. This has had detrimental effects in the development of the microfinance sector that is 
meant to serve the poor.  
The majority of rural Zimbabweans remain completely cut-off from the traditional banking services. The same was 
echoed by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) governor in his April 2007 Monetary Policy Statement (ZAMFI3, 2007). 
He pointed out that there was need to rope in the rural communities for inclusion into the financial system. According to 
ZAMFI, the per capita banking facility ratios in rural areas indicate unacceptable levels of financial exclusion of the rural 
populace. Despite the prohibitive macroeconomic environment, there is general consensus from government circles that 
microfinance can be used as a strategy for poverty alleviation in Zimbabwe. The situation on the ground suggests that 
the demand for microfinance resources is very high. This study also pays attention to the demand for microfinance in 
Zimbabwe.  
 
4. Demand for Microfinance 
 
Effective demand or simply demand is the willingness and ability that people have to acquire a commodity. In this case 
the commodity refers to microfinance services offered by different suppliers that may be formal (such as banks and 
MFIs), quasi-formal (such as NGOs) or informal (such as relatives and friends). A commodity is anything that has the 
ability to give satisfaction or utility to the purchaser. Microfinance resources are on demand because of their ability to 
meet the capital needs of the poor who are considered ‘unbankable’. Robinson (2001:10) states that about 80 percent of 
the world’s population has no access to formal sector financial services. This percentage is higher (about 95%) in the 
developing countries as posited by Hailu (2008). Most of the demand for microfinance resources comes from those 
operating in the unregulated, informal sector of the economy (Robinson, 2001:11; 2002).  
The informal sector is a manifestation of the failure of the formal sector to meet the needs and wants of the people. 
                                                                            
3 ZAMFI is Zimbabwe Association of Microfinance Institutions. The organization is made up of voluntary membership of microfinance 
institutions (MFIs). 
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Therefore, they find refuge in the informal sector for employment incomes, assets accumulation and livelihoods. This 
sector is characterized with enterprises that; have non-legal status, lack authorized business location, have no standard 
forms of collateral security, are small in size and their business activities are risky. These characteristic features 
discourage banks to supply the sector with financial services. Traditional banks are not willing to take the risk because 
they rate the sector ‘credit unworthy’. This scenario has created a huge gap that gets filled by private moneylenders who 
usually charge usurious rates of interest hence exploiting the vulnerable poor people. This is where the misconception of 
microfinance as a usurious product emerges. Many people thing that microfinance only means short loans by private 
money-lenders who are popularly known as ‘loan sharks’ because of their usurious acts. 
The Zimbabwean economy is dominated by small to medium enterprises (SMEs). In 1998, an estimated 860 000 
micro and small enterprises were engaged in manufacturing, commerce and service activities. They generated self-
employment and jobs for about 25 percent of the Zimbabwean population (Barnes et al, 2001. See also Bakhoum et al. 
1989 and Basu et al. 2004). As the crisis in Zimbabwe worsened, demand for loans remained high because people were 
relying on the informal sector for a living (Bell et al, 2002).  
According to ZAMFI (2007), the unprecedented economic decline witnessed the emergence and growth of the 
informal sector in leaps and bounds. ZAMFI also quoted the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) citing that in 2005, the 
formal sector employment accounted for 16 percent of the labor force. The informal sector accounted for 40 percent and 
the communal sector for 44 percent. The RBZ also cited that the informal sector was responsible for the livelihoods of 
about 80 percent of the population (until 2007) following the shrinkage of the formal sector since 2000.  
The ESAP period (1991-1995) led to retrenchments and downsizing by the formal sector. These casualties made 
people to look for new economic opportunities that were only visible in the informal sector. The sector managed to 
absorb the retrenched and this made it very important because it provided a quick alternative to those who had been laid 
off. Micro-entrepreneurs have become a vibrant part of the Zimbabwean economy. Micro-enterprises are a vital source of 
income, particularly for the rural poor. After recognizing the important contribution of the informal sector, the government 
of Zimbabwe established the Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprise Development that was mandated to promote the 
small businesses sector. The growth of the informal sector is followed by simple economic logic that explains high 
demand for microfinance in Zimbabwe.  
Rural areas are seriously underserviced by the traditional providers of financial services. Traditional banks argue 
that it is problematic to provide financial services to the rural areas because of their remoteness. Servicing rural remote 
areas comes with very high transaction costs hence raising sustainability questions. The cost per dollar or rand lent is 
very high, making it unsustainable. Moreover, rural areas have information asymmetry leading to moral hazard 4 
problems. This distortion in the rural economies is explained by the intrinsic limitations of the price system in the rural 
areas. Hoff et al. (1993), identify adverse selection and moral hazard as common rural sector problems. Adverse 
selection5 refers to the problem of sorting or choosing borrowers (customers) whose quality is not known (quality 
uncertainty). Moral hazard arises when a customer takes action to maximize own welfare that is to the detriment of 
others. This also applies to the Zimbabwean rural areas hence the emergence of a disparity between demand for and 
supply of microfinance. 
 
5. Supply of Microfinance 
 
Microfinance market structures vary from one country to the next depending on financial development, policy 
environment and level of economic development. In Zimbabwe microfinance is provided by banks, Post Office savings 
Bank (POSB), microfinance institutions (MFIs), associations (ROSCAs6), Regular (non-rotating) Savings and Credit 
Associations- RESCAs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), relatives and friends, and private money-lenders. The 
government is also a supplier of microfinance resources to the rural poor; however the latter has been politicized. 
Microfinance services that are provided for agriculture and seasonal loans are often available in kind. For example, the 
government’s ‘maguta/ inala program’ (bumper harvest program) of 2007, with farmers getting diesel, seeds, farm 
                                                                            
4 In other words moral hazard in lending refers to situations where lenders cannot observe either the effort made or action taken by the 
borrower, or the realization of project returns. This could be ex ante or ex post (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). 
5 see Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005:29 for a clear explanation of ‘adverse selection’. 
6 ROSCAs are Rotating Savings and Credit Associations. They are essentially a group of individuals who make regular cyclical monetary 
contributions into a savings pool. Group members borrow money from the pool at a given rate of interest. They are referred to as banks 
for the poor. RESCAs are Regular (non-rotating) Savings and Credit Associations-members contribute but all do not necessarily borrow 
(Robinson, 2001:50). 
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implements, fertilizers and herbicides. Unfortunately, the program was hampered by drought that negatively affected 
agricultural production. Small-holder famers were not able to repay the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) making it to lose 
lots of money in unpaid loans (bad debts). Government efforts to support the microfinance sector are complimented by 
the donor community.  
According to UNDP Zimbabwe (2008), the microfinance sector experienced a phenomenal growth in 2007 in 
tandem to the growth of the informal sector as the formal sector faced serious challenges. UNDP’s report further state 
that 309 microfinance institutions and micro lending institutions (MLIs) were registered with the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe (RBZ). However, the worsening problems of the mid-2008 left approximately 150 out of 309 MFIs and MLIs 
operational representing about 48%. These were mainly affected by the hyperinflationary pressures that characterized 
the period. An inappropriate legal framework also contributed to the constraints. 
 
6. Donor Interventions in the Sector 
 
Since 1980, many international donors stepped up their involvement in the microfinance sector (Pearson and Hungwe, 
1997). A number of international donor organizations were involved, since independence, in the support of small to 
medium (SME) programs. These efforts were meant to close the supply gap left open by the traditional financial sector. 
The donor agents included Australian Agency for International Development (AUSAID), Austrian Government, and British 
Department for International Development (DFID), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and German 
Development Co-operation (GTZ). The other organizations involved include Hivos Foundation, Konrad Adanauer 
Foundation (KAF), Royal Netherlands Embassy, United Nations Development Program, United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), Norwegian People’s Aid, African Development Foundation (ADF), Oxfam, Catholic 
Development Commission (CADEC), CARE, NORAD and Catholic Relief services (CRS). The list is not exhaustive.  
Donor support activities included capacity building, human resources development, technical assistance, 
monitoring and evaluation, training (staff and board members) and the revolving loan funds. Unfortunately, in July 2008 a 
number of donors were banned by the government. This was the hardest blow ever to the growth of microfinance in 
Zimbabwe. Local NGOs and banks also support the microfinance sector. 
 
7. Local NGOs and Banks Intervention 
 
Commercial banks that support the microfinance initiative include Barclays Bank, Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ), 
Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe (AGRIBANK), Post Office Savings Bank (POSB), and Kingdom Bank (through its 
subsidiary Microking7). This list is not exhaustive (Pearson and Hungwe, 1997). These banks have facilities of giving 
relatively small loans to SMEs.  
Local NGOs include Credit Against Poverty-Masvingo (CAP), Dondolo Mudonzvo, Environment and Development 
Activities (ENDA), National Association of Cooperative Savings and Credit Unions of Zimbabwe (NASCUZ), Organization 
of Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP), Phakama Savings and Credit Cooperative Society, Self-Help Development 
Foundation (SHDF), Zambuko Trust, and Zimbabwe Ecumenical Church Loan Fund (ZECLOF). Also adding to the list is 
Zimbabwe Project Trust (ZPT), Zimbabwe Women’s Bureau (ZWB) and Zimbabwe women’s Finance Trust (ZWFT), and 
Rural Unity for Development Organization (RUDO), Catholic Development Commission (CADEC).  
These organizations act as conduits that receive money from donors and pass it to the poor people in the informal 
sector. They run revolving loan funds so as to remain sustainable. However, their sustainability strategies were eroded 
by Zimbabwe’s hyperinflationary environment. Government organizations also play an important role in supporting the 
poor with microfinance services. 
 
8. Government Involvement 
 
The Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) assists the SMEs and small holder farmers through its parastatals such as 
AGRIBANK, Small Enterprise Development Corporation (SEDCO), Social Development Fund (SDF) [under the Ministry 
of Public Service, Labor and Social Welfare]. The Ministry of Gender and Youth Development also gives loans to women 
and youth for their developmental projects meant to pull them out of poverty (Pearson and Hungwe, 1997). This initiative 
resulted from swelling unemployment among the youth and was also used as an empowerment strategy for women.  
                                                                            
7 MICROKING Finance is the micro enterprise finance division of Kingdom Bank Ltd. 
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The government’s involvement cannot end by providing loans to the poor. It is its responsibility to create a 
supportive legal environment. Private moneylenders are viewed as exploitative monopolists who systematically squeeze 
the poor (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005:27). The moneylenders enjoy local monopoly power because 
potential competitors cannot enter the market due to lack of information (information asymmetry) and connections. High 
interest rates continue to worry governments today. This is not exclusive to Zimbabwe. Armendariz de Aghion and 
Morduch (2005:28), note that Siaamwala et al, 1990, reported 120 percent interest rates in Thailand; Aleem (1990) found 
them to be between 8 and 200 percent in Pakistan; and Steel et al (1997) established that the interest rates were 50 
percent points higher than formal sector rates in Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria and Tanzania. 
The situation of high interest rates forces governments to give cheap credit to the poor people. This has not 
achieved much in pulling people out of poverty. Ironically, cheap credit has been criticized for contributing towards the 
underdevelopment of rural areas. Adams et al (1984), in their book Undermining Rural Development with Cheap Credit, 
unequivocally pointed out that, low interest rates undermine microfinance and rural development. The Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) in 1996 also hints that interest rates charged should promote the sustainability of 
MFIs (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005:52). This suggests for the commercialization of microfinance as 
opposed to subsidization. Above all, the government should ensure a supportive legal environment for the efficacy of 
microfinance. What is the situation in Zimbabwe? 
 
9. Zimbabwean Legal Environment and Microfinance 
 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) is responsible for monitoring the monetary policy (RBZ, 2004; RBZ, 2005; ZAMFI, 
2005). It also administers the operations of the financial sector and is responsible for ensuring a sound and sustainable 
financial system. MFIs form part of the financial sector hence they are under the control of the RBZ. Their operations are 
guided by the Money-Lenders’ Act. MFIs are required to be registered with the RBZ and are given operating licenses that 
are renewed annually. It becomes the responsibility of the RBZ to create an enabling legal environment in support of the 
microfinance sector. Currently, the legal environment is not very supportive of the microfinance sector.  
MFIs have legal incapacity to raise savings. The Moneylenders’ Act provides the legal framework for all non-bank 
intermediaries engaged in lending activities. It does not allow NGOs to mobilize savings (Raftopoulos and Lacoste, 
2001). NGOs that are willing to expand operations in the microfinance sector cannot facilitate savings mobilization unless 
they are registered under the Company and Banking Act. The financial requirements of this Act were in 2005 toughened 
in order to deter opportunistic newcomers. The new Act states that the minimum paid up equity capital must be Z$ 100 
million (which was equivalent to USD10 000). This was completely out of reach of Zimbabwean MFIs. They further note 
that, nevertheless, the new Minister of Finance (in office since June 2000) sent positive signals to the microfinance 
industry, since its role in supporting the informal economy is increasingly acknowledged.  
As noted by ZAMFI (2005), microfinance is widely acknowledged as a viable strategy for promoting informal sector 
business activities. The importance of the informal economy in serving as a safety net in times of deep economic crisis 
can never be overemphasized. The introduction of a new “microfinance” Act, adapted to the specific capacities and 
needs of MFIs, is actually one of the main responsibilities of the Zimbabwean Association of Microfinance Institution 
(ZAMFI), but much has still to be done before a new legislation comes into effect (Raftopoulos and Lacoste, 2001). 
ZAMFI lobbies for the crafting (by government) of a supportive microfinance legal policy framework. The policy 
framework will go a long way in promoting MFI activities. The background above shows that there is deep and wide 
poverty in Zimbabwe hence the need for a strategy to fight it from the grassroots. 
10. Microfinance Industry in a Crisis Zimbabwe 
 
The Zimbabwean economy faced a crisis period due to the deteriorating socio-economic and political conditions. Thus 
the economic fundamentals suffered mainly from political challenges that were experienced between 2000 and 2009. 
The microfinance sector almost disappeared because of the harsh economic environment.  
 
11. Current Policy Trends in the Microfinance Sector 
 
There is a plethora of policy orientations that impact (positively or negatively) on microfinance activities. But more 
importantly, there are three policy actions that should be fine-tuned to promote microfinance. These are macro-economic 
stability, liberalized interest rates and appropriate banking and supervisory practices (Adams and Raymond, 2008). Due 
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to the challenges that the Zimbabwean economy has experienced, the government noticed the resilience that was 
displayed by small to medium enterprises (SMEs) both in the formal and informal sector. The informal sector ballooned 
as formal businesses were collapsing due to the harsh economic conditions. So the informal sector played a significant 
role in the economy during the Zimbabwean economic crisis (Makina, 2010; Mackochekanwa and Kwaramba, 2010; 
Makochekanwa, 2007. The economy survived on SMEs (both formal and informal) as drivers of economic activities that 
sustained the livelihoods of the people. This realization prompted the government to address questions about an 
enabling environment for promoting the microfinance sector.  
The microfinance sector in Zimbabwe has been operating without a policy for decades. A piece of legislation that 
has been in use is the Money Lenders’ Act that was promulgated by the government. However, the Act has not been 
supportive enough to encourage the growth of the sector (ZAMFI, 2005; UNDP Zimbabwe, 2008). As discussed earlier, 
the RBZ in 2005 put in place a Consultative National Task Force to look into the development of a National Microfinance 
Policy. In 2008, the policy was developed to ensure supervision of the sector. The microfinance policy is a welcome 
development which was being pushed for by ZAMFI (the main stakeholder). The National Microfinance Policy was 
developed by the National Microfinance Task Force on microfinance. Members of the task force were Government 
ministries, apex organizations of microfinance and moneylenders, microfinance institutions, development partners, and 
the RBZ (RBZ, 2008). The policy development process started with the establishment of a task force in 2005 whose main 
mandate was to develop mechanisms that would guide the development of a sustainable microfinance industry. 
That task force started by commissioning a survey through a consultancy firm (Ernst & Young) between December 
2005 and March 2006. The survey found out that about 30% of the economically active population is serviced by the 
formal financial system while 70% are excluded. This group is often serviced by the semi-formal or informal financial 
sectors. The major output of this process was the formulation of the National Microfinance Policy in 2008. According to 
RBZ (2008), the main objective of the policy is to promote a vibrant microfinance sector that would be adequately 
integrated into the mainstream financial system and provide the stimulus for growth and development. Specific policy 
objectives are: 
• to promote the development of a robust, inclusive financial sector; 
• to promote synergy and mainstreaming of the informal sub-sector into the national financial system; 
• to enhance service delivery by microfinance institutions to the economically active poor and SMEs; 
• to contribute to rural transformation; and 
• to promote linkage programs between commercial banks, building societies, development banks, specialized 
institutions and microfinance banks and other microfinance stakeholders (National Taskforce on Microfinance, 
2008:11). 
The Southern Africa Microfinance & Enterprise Capacity Enhancement Facility (SAMCAF) carried out a SADC 
study in 2008 synthesized the salient features of the Zimbabwean National Microfinance policy as follows: 
 Creation of an enabling regulatory environment supportive of sustainable microfinance initiatives and 
infrastructure through the establishment of microfinance banks (deposit-taking); 
 Integrating microfinance into the formal financial system to ensure permanent access to financial services on a 
sustainable basis; 
 Development of performance standards for monitoring of microfinance institutions; 
 Setting up an appropriate capacity building programmes for the microfinance sector to bridge the technical 
skills gap, especially among microfinance practitioners, regulators and apex organisations. 
 Establishment of a credit reference bureau to improve the flow of information, enhance credit risk 
management practices and aid decision making on current and potential microfinance clients. (SAMCAF, 
2008:35). 
The National Microfinance policy sets a clear direction, however the government needs to expedite the process of 
developing and adopting an appropriate regulatory and supervisory framework to enhance vibrancy in the sector. The 
microfinance sector eagerly awaits the final adoption of the policy to allow the sharpening of innovative mechanisms for 
the growth of the sector in Zimbabwe. 
12. Conclusion 
 
The government of Zimbabwe followed some policy episodes since the attainment of independence in 1980. They can be 
categorized into the ‘centralist policies’ (1980 to 1990), ‘market oriented policies’ from 1991 to 2000 and the ‘crisis period 
policies’ of 2000 to 2009. Most of the policies were meant to address poverty but very little was achieved because of 
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challenges at macro-level. Micro-level policy strategies such as microfinance failed to receive attention after a long time. 
Recently, in Zimbabwe, the RBZ managed to come up with a National Microfinance Policy that is meant to regulate and 
support the sector for sustainable operations. The evolution and developments of microfinance in Zimbabwe show that 
he demand for microfinance is higher than the supply hence the existence of a gap between demand and supply. 
Microfinance services are supplied by private money-lenders, government, NGOs, and informal sources such as friends 
and relatives. The government of Zimbabwe has been criticized for failing to articulate the two policy categories. 
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